Rehabilitating the Crusades

No one could ever accuse me of being an apologist for the Roman Catholic Church, so I think that I'm clear to say that the shifting positions by the Vatican under the new administration of Pope Benedict is a very welcome development. One example is the conference this past weekend at the Regina Apostolorum Pontifical University sponsored by the Vatican where speakers spoke in defense of the Crusades of the Medieval Era (HT:LGF).

Another example is the private debate last September amongst the Pope's inner circle of former students about the relations with Islam, which was reported by the Vatican beat reporter for L'espresso, Sandro Magister. As Magister reminds us in a piece published back in December, Holy War: The Year the Muslims Took Rome, the Vatican is no stranger to the assaults of the Islamic hordes. In 846, Rome and the Vatican were sacked by the Muslims in a hit-and-run raid. Here's how Magister describes it:

"What happened is that in 846 some Muslim Arabs arrived in a fleet at the mouth of the Tiber, made their way to Rome, sacked the city, and carried away from the basilica of St. Peter all of the gold and silver it contained. And this was not just an incidental attack. In 827 the Arabs had conquered Sicily, which they kept under their dominion for two and a half centuries. Rome was under serious threat from nearby. In 847, the year after the assault, the newly elected pope Leo IV began the construction of walls around the entire perimeter of the Vatican, 12 meters high and equipped with 44 towers. He completed the project in six years. These are the “Leonine” walls, and significant traces of them still remain. But very few today know that these walls were erected to defend the see of Peter from an Islamic jihad. And many of those who do know this remain silent out of discretion. “Bridges, not walls” is the fashionable slogan today."

Magister has also reported recently that the Papal Secretariat of State has lodged diplomatic complaints against Iran's treatment of Christians, and that La Civilita Cattolica, a publication of the Jesuit order, has also chronicled the abuse of Christians in Muslim countries (link includes translated excerpts from the article). This is especially important as the world hears in recent days of the pending execution of an Afghani man for converting to Christianity.

A revisiting of the Crusades is not only helpful to understand past events, but imperative to comprehend present ones. The war against the West by Islam is just another stage in a conflict that has been raging since the Seventh Century. The West has been made to feel shame regarding the Crusades, but this sense of shame wasn't developed by Islamic propaganda, but by the Western critics of Western Civilization/Christendom.

In fact, the Crusades were an effort to take the battle to the Islamic world and reverse the gains of the Muslim world at the expense of Christianity that had accumulated for several hundred years. The Christian occupants of those lands were given two options: forceable conversion or the sword. While many in the West forget about the Muslim invasions of Europe in the Middle Ages that were turned back only with the Christian victory by Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours/Poitiers (732) and the battles of "El Cid Campeador" immortalized by the Lay of the Cid, they have even more forgetfulness of the Reconquista of Spain from the Moors by Isabella of Castile (1492), the Siege of Vienna by Sulieman (1529), the great naval Battle of Lepanto (1571; see G.K. Chesterton's poem about the battle, Lepanto) and the Battle of Vienna (1683) between Mehmed IV and Jan Sobieski in the Modern Era. These battles and Christian victories ought to be fresh in the minds and familiar on the lips of every Christian child and adult in the West.

If you're interested in an alternative version of the Crusades to the hand-wringing "Kingdom of Heaven" version made popular over the past century, check out this short but informative article by Crusade scholar Thomas Madden from the April 2002 edition of Crisis Magazine, "The Real History of the Crusades."

And bully for the Papists who are showing signs of cultural courage by challenging the revisionist history of the brave defense of Christendom in the Crusades. If only Protestants and Evangelicals were equally willing to show such courage. Do yourself a favor tonight. Go to Blockbuster and rent the epic film, El Cid.

Mercersburg on the Atonement, Part 1

To help readers get better acquainted with the teachings and doctrines of Mercersburg Theology and its departure from the historic Reformed faith, I intend to post some of their writings here to better familiarize others with just exactly what they taught -- from their own statements and writings. The following is taken from an article published by one of the Mercersburg theology professors and a disciple of John Williamson Nevin and Philip Schaff. In this article the author rejects that the doctrine of substitutionary atonement of Christ is taught in the Heidelberg Catechism and that the doctrine is incompatible with the gospel. Here are his words taken from the official publication of the German Reformed Church:

"A superficial study of the Heidelberg Catechism may make the impression that the atoning sacrifice of Christ accomplished on the cross is not only essential, but also fundamental and principial, in its doctrinal system of redemption. It teaches, that Christ bore in body and soul the wrath of God against the sin of the whole human race, in order that by His passion, as 'the only atoning sacrifice, He might redeem our body and soul from everlasting damnation (Q. 37); that the sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross is the only ground of our salvation, and that our whole-salvation stands in the one sacrifice of Christ, made for us on the cross' (Q. 67). Again, the Catechism says 'that we have full forgiveness of all our sins by the one sacrifice of Jesus Christ' (Q. 80). Many other expressions occur, which are equally explicit. That this doctrinal system underlies and animates the Heidelberg Catechism we cannot believe. The notion is incompatible with the central position of the Creed; incompatible also with its conception of the gospel, as an order of grace standing in the personal history of Jesus Christ." (emphasis added) “The Doctrine of the Catechism concerning the Atoning Death of Christ." Reformed Church Messenger (September 17, 1873)

Nevin, Hodge, Dabney, and Mark Horne

Following up on my last post regarding the revival of 19th-Century Mercersburg Theology on the outermost fringes of the Reformed world (Mercersburg Theology — A Warning from the Past), the savage and very personal criticisms, both public and private, that was directed my way in response prompted me to revisit some of the materials written by Mercersburg’s contemporary supporters and advocates.

Perhaps one of the more notable of these attempts to rehabilitate and revive Mercersburg Theology is Mark Horne’s 1997 PCA Taylor Aiken Award-winning paper in Church History, Real Union or Legal Fiction? John Williamson Nevin’s Controversy With Charles Hodge Over the Imputation of Adam’s Sin (with a Comparison to Robert L. Dabney). Horne currently serves as assistant pastor of Providence Reformed Presbyterian Church (PCA) in St. Louis, Missouri. Even this earlier week he expressed his “appreciation, maybe even admiration” for Nevin.

The bulk of his Aiken Award-winning paper is dedicated to one small aspect of the extended dispute between Princeton professor Charles Hodge and his errant protégé, John Williamson Nevin, the chief theologian of Mercersburg Theology.

Horne’s analysis of Hodge and Nevin on the imputation of Adam’s sin appears a fair representation of the vast theological gulf that existed between the two. It is worth noting that Hodge and Nevin had many other points of disagreement beyond this, such as Nevin’s rejection of Calvinistic soteriology (see Nevin’s second article on “Hodge on the Ephesians”, Mercersburg Review 9 [April 1857]: 192–245), and the Calvinistic view of sacraments (see Hodge’s extensive rebuttal of Nevin’s book, The Mystical Presence, in his article “Doctrine of the Reformed Church on the Lord’s Supper”, Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review 20 [April 1848]: 227–278).

But Horne does not limit his discussion to just Nevin and Hodge on this small topic. In order to qualify Nevin within the bounds of acceptable Reformed theology, Horne marshals none other than the great Southern Presbyterian theologian, R.L. Dabney, to verify Nevin’s Reformed credentials. Horne states:

“One reason for believing that Nevin belongs to the debate within American Presbyterianism is that Dabney seems to have articulated substantially the same view of the imputation of Adam’s sin.”

Horne here admits that his purpose is to call on Dabney as proof that Nevin “belongs to the debate within American Presbyterianism”. As one of the most revered theological minds in American Presbyterianism (along with Hodge), Horne does well to cite Dabney. That is, of course, if the slipper does in fact fit.

It seems (not having read all of Horne’s citations for Dabney) that he accurately represents Dabney’s disagreement with Hodge over the nature of the imputation of Adam’s sin. I offer that as a given. But discussion of imputation of Adam’s sin without considering the corresponding soteriological implications for the believers union with Christ, justification, and imputation of Christ’s sin to believer, as well as any sacramental implications, could raise the response of “so what?” And any agreement between Nevin and Dabney on the sole issue of the imputation of Adam’s sin, a subset of theological interest, would hardly be the vindication of Nevin as within the bounds of American Presbyterianism that Horne intends it to be unless it extends to these other important soteriological issues as well.

In fact, in the conclusion to his paper Horne draws his evidence together hoping to build a final case by taking the seeming agreement between Nevin and Dabney on the issue of imputation of Adam’s sin and extending out that alleged agreement to those related soteriological implications. He identifies seven “implicitly or explicitly” held area of agreement between Nevin and Dabney:

In summary, this paper has attempted to make a prima facie case that both Nevin and Dabney share a view at odds with the “immediate imputation” of Charles Hodge, but not, as Hodge claimed in the case of Nevin, at odds with notion of forensic justification. They seem to have held, implicitly or explicitly, the following points in common against him:

1. Union with Christ [51] is the basis for the justification of believers.



2. This union is brought about through the power of the Holy Spirit at a certain point in time in a person’s life (regeneration).



3. The inception of this union not only is the basis of justification, but the beginning of sanctification.



4. This union with Christ parallels the union with Adam which all people possess.



5. Whereas, in the case of Christ, the union is a Spiritual union (= through the Holy Spirit), in the case of Adam, the union is a natural union (= through the flesh).



6. Whereas union with Christ is given to sinners who already exist, union with Adam is given by natural generation and starts their existence.



7. Though the basis for condemnation in Adam and justification in Christ are not simply legal relationships, both the condemnation and the justification arising from the respective unions are essentially legal states. To elaborate, to be justified is to be declared righteous and to be condemened to be declared unrighteous. The legal character of such declarations is not compromised by the fact that they are based on realities which are not themselves reducible to forensic concepts.

Now understand that Horne here has made the leap from talking about the imputation of Adam’s sin — almost the entire focus of the paper — to the added soteriological questions of union with Christ, justification and the nature of the imputation of Christ’s righteousness. We discover at this point that this is where Horne has been leading us all along. The intent of his paper was not just to show that there was disagreement between Nevin and Hodge on the imputation of Adam’s sin, and calling Dabney in to verify Nevin’s view on that point; his invocation of Dabney is intended to vindicate Nevin’s entire soteriology, as Horne makes clear in the continuation of his conclusion:

The similarities between Nevin and Dabney, despite real differences in theological and philosophical perspective, should provide additional evidence that Nevin, whatever his faults, was not simply the quasi-Romanist as which Hodge attempted to portray him. The mere fact that Hodge’s depiction of Nevin as rejecting the Protestant doctrine of forensic justification was also applicable to Dabney should indicate a high probability that Hodge was defending his own personal preferences, not the truths of the Reformation. However Nevin’s views later developed (or decayed), and no one claims he changed substantially in this area, he did not say anything in Mystical Presence that justified Hodge’s accusation that he denied forensic imputation. (emphasis added)

Horne says quite clearly that he is using Dabney to defend Nevin against Hodge not just on the isolated issue of the imputation of Adam’s sin, but Nevin’s entire scheme of redemption. It is at this point when Horne begins drawing out these conclusions that his case completely falls apart. Even more than that, Horne knows it. You only need to follow the link to the final endnote [51] of his paper, cited in point 1 of his conclusion, to see how he has rather conveniently buried the evidence against his final conclusion:

51. Dabney radically rejected Nevin’s understanding of that union, however. He wrote: “Now, I cannot but believe that the gross and extreme views of a real presence and opus operatum, in the Lord’s supper, which prevailed in the Church from the patristic ages throughout the mediaeval, and which infect the minds of many Protestants now, arise from an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union. This union effectuates redemption. We all agree that the sacraments are its signs and seals. (See I Cor, xii:13: I Cor. x: 17, et passim). Now, the Fathers seem to have imagined that spiritual life must result from a literal and substantive intromission of Christ’s person into our souls, just as corporeal nutrition can only result when the food is taken substantially into the stomach, and assimilated with our corporeal substance. In this sense they seem to have understood the eating of Jno. [sic] vi: 51, etc. (which was currently misapplied to the Lord’s Supper). Hence, how natural that in the Lord’s supper, the sacramental sign and seal of the vitalizing union, they should imagine a real presence, not only of the God-head naturally, and of the Holy Spirit in His sanctifying influences, but of the whole Mediatorial person, and a literal feeding thereon. Hence, afterward, transubstantiation and consubstantiation, and the more refined, though equally impossible theory of Calvin, of a literal, and yet only spiritual feeding on the whole person. The same general law of thought appears in what may be called the Pan-Christism of the “Mercersburg School,” of modern semi-Pantheism. These divines have revived the old mystical idea of the substantive oneness of the human and divine spirit, through the medium of the incarnation, consistently assert a species of real presence of the mediatorial person in the Supper” (Systematic Theology, p. 617). Nevertheless, despite their differing conceptions of union with Christ, both seem to have a similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation — that “This union effectuates redemption.”

I will freely admit that Horne has done the right thing at least by begrudgingly acknowledging the damning evidence against him here, but it isn’t surprising that it’s buried in the final endnote of the paper. The quote from Dabney here that Horne cites is taken from Lecture 51 of Dabney’s Systematic Theology, Union with Christ. Horne is forced to admit — in the endnote! — that “Dabney radically rejected Nevin’s understanding of that union”. It is important to note that the union discussed here is Nevin’s doctrine of the union with Christ. That Dabney rejected Nevin’s understanding of it is an extremely relevant point — much more than what Horne seems to make of it — because Horne still wants to contend that they share similar views on justification on the alleged basis of their two equated views on union with Christ (Point 1 of his conclusion).

The reason why I believe that Horne’s case is undermined entirely is that if Dabney “radically rejects” Nevin’s understanding of the union with Christ, not only does it eviscerate his conclusion in point 1 equating Dabney and Nevin’s view of union with Christ and justification; it invalidates their supposed agreement drawn by inference from that in all the other concluding points as well. One stiff blast of wind delivered by the Southern Presbyterian Dabney disassembles Horne’s tenuous house of cards and the supposed vindication of Nevin’s soteriology from Hodge’s attack.

With reference to Nevin’s mystical union, Dabney in the quote above calls it “Pan-Christism” and identifies it with “modern semi-Pantheism”. And Dabney makes his view clear with reference to the mystical union immediately following where Horne stopped his citation: “Let us disembarrass our views of the mystical union.” Which views of the mystical union does he tell us to disembarrass ourselves from? The divines of the “Mercersburg School”. And who does he have in mind specifically? None other than John Williamson Nevin, the premier advocate in Mercersburg of “mystical union”.

It is hard to think of a more specific rejection by Dabney of Nevin’s views at the very point at which that Horne argues they are in agreement. Not only does Dabney locate Nevin in the precincts outside American Presbyterianism; he places him outside the realm of Nicene Christianity altogether (unless Horne wants to argue that “semi-Pantheism” should be considered an acceptable expression of Christianity).

Other scholars have been more forthright than Horne regarding Dabney, Nevin and Hodge regarding their soteriological views. Emory theology professor E. Brooks Holifield offered this conclusion more than thirty years ago with reference to this theological trio:

Union with Christ. The phrase pointed to one of the revered motifs of Reformed theology, and neither Hodge nor Dabney had any desire to discard it. But for them the crucial soteriological category was “imputation,” and Hodge feared that Nevin’s language about the mystical union covertly substituted a theory of inherent righteousness for the doctrine that God graciously “imputed” Christ’s righteousness to the elect believer. It was manifest to Hodge that in Nevin’s system the believer received the righteousness of Christ by participating in his nature, which Nevin believed to be uniquely though not exclusively manifested in and through the sacrament. Hodge concluded that according to Nevin there could be no “imputation of either sin or righteousness to us, except they belong to us, are inherently our own.” But this, Hodge continued, was a terrifying notion, because our inherent righteousness, or rather our lack of it, deserved only divine wrath. Nevin denied, however, that he made redemption contingent on inherent human goodness; he claimed, rather, to have merely established an intrinsic “community of life” between Christ and the believer as the basis for God’s imputation of righteousness. Imputation was not groundless; its basis was participation in the life of Christ, but this did not imply any inherent righteousness in the believer. Nevin simply wanted to say that union with Christ was the crucial moment in the order of salvation. He wanted to affirm a relation of participation between the created, fallen self and the incarnate saviour, whose life had passed over to his people as the Church.

Dabney agreed with Hodge’s charge that Nevin pushed the theme of participation to an heretical extremity. He charged that Nevin’s unguarded language about union with Christ led the Mercersburg theologians to adopt a pantheistic “Pan-Christism” that obliterated the distinction between the human and the divine. From Dabney’s vantage point, Nevin’s incarnational theology seemed to entail the “substantive oneness” of divinity and humanity — an unthinkable conclusion. When he lectured on soteriology, Dabney carefully preserved the line of demarcation between the human and the divine. Specifically, he denied the suggestion, characteristic of Mercersburg, that Christ had taken generic human nature into union with himself in the course of his mediatorial work. The denial rested on Dabney’s belief that no reprobate sinners could participate in such a union. Since reprobate sinners obviously existed — and just as obviously possessed a human nature — it was inconceivable that the incarnation effected any union between the divine Christ and humanity-in-general. Conceiving of men and women as atomistic individuals, and affirming with the seventeenth century Synod of Dort that Christ’s atonement encompassed only a portion of mankind, Dabney refused to speak of the salvation of humanity in principle as a prelude to or basis for the actualized salvation of individuals. In Dabney’s view, in fact the incarnation did not involve any “substantial” union even between Christ and his elect; it simply established the basis for a “legal union.” That is, by assuming a specific human nature (as opposed to generic human nature) the Logos fulfilled the formal conditions required for the forensic act of imputation. Thus the distinction between man and God was fully maintained. (“Mercersburg, Princeton, and the South: The Sacramental Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Presbyterian History 54 (1976): 247–248.)

Holifield cites the exact same lecture and quotation by Dabney as Horne, and yet associates him with Hodge rather than with Nevin regarding their views on union with Christ, justification and the imputation of Christ’s righteouness. He goes so far as to state: “Dabney agreed with Hodge’s charge that Nevin pushed the theme of participation to an heretical extremity.” While Dabney might have shared one theological aspect with reference to Nevin’s view of the imputation of Adam’s sin, Holifield notes that Dabney made one very crucial distinction when it came to applying it to union with Christ:

He charged that Nevin’s unguarded language about union with Christ led the Mercersburg theologians to adopt a pantheistic “Pan-Christism” that obliterated the distinction between the human and the divine. From Dabney’s vantage point, Nevin’s incarnational theology seemed to entail the “substantive oneness” of divinity and humanity — an unthinkable conclusion.

I do find it curious that Horne nowhere mentions Holifield’s analysis anywhere in his paper. It isn’t even cited in the bibliography, which is particularly strange that Horne would not consult, let alone interact with, one of the very few scholarly discussions of the exact topic he is writing on available at that time, especially since it flatly contradicts the very case that Horne attempts to make.

That said, looking at Dabney’s comments and Holifield’s analysis, it seems that Horne’s conclusions regarding Dabney and Nevin’s supposed agreement on the issue of union with Christ is based on nothing more than wishful thinking.

But there is one more curious element to Horne’s representations that I want to explore.

In the last sentence of the very important final endnote, Horne generalizes the agreement between Nevin and Dabney on their views of union with Christ:

Nevertheless, despite their (Dabney and Nevin — P) differing conceptions of union with Christ, both seem to have a similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation — that “This union effectuates redemption.” (emphasis added)

That last phrase, “This union effectuates redemption”, is taken from the citation of Dabney’s lectures. Horne uses it to claim that Dabney and Nevin had a “similar use for the doctrine in discussing imputation.” Again, the “imputation” involved here is not Adam, the stated focus of Horne’s paper, but the imputation of Christ’s righteousness.

But exactly the opposite is true. Let’s look at Dabney again:

Now, I cannot but believe that the gross and extreme views of a real presence and opus operatum, in the Lord’s supper, which prevailed in the Church from the patristic ages throughout the mediaeval, and which infect the minds of many Protestants now, arise from an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union. This union effectuates redemption. (emphasis added)

Here Dabney is not stating his agreement with Nevin’s view, but in fact he is actually rejecting it! When he uses the definite determiner “this union”, what union is he talking about? The answer immediately precedes the statement: “an erroneous and overstrained view of the mystical union”, which he later identifies with the “Mercersburg School” — meaning John Williamson Nevin. Dabney identifes as “erroneous and overstrained” the view that “this union effectuates redemption” — the very same view that Horne tells us that Nevin and Dabney share!

There is no language whatsoever in the passage Horne quotes or anywhere in the remote vicinity to turn this into a statement of agreement by Dabney with Nevin. The statement when read in context can only be taken to mean the opposite of what Horne represents it as. This should really call into question whether Horne understands what he is reading at all, or if he is so bound and determined to place Nevin within the pale of Reformed orthodoxy that he will manufacture the evidence out of whole cloth in order to do it. I will leave that question for him to answer, but it should immediately raise concerns about his ability to accurately represent the theological similarities and differences between John Williamson Nevin, Charles Hodge and Robert L. Dabney.

In conclusion:

1. Horne gravely errs by attempting to make the leap from Nevin and Dabney’s roughly similar views on the imputation of Adam’s sin to make them advocating the same position on union with Christ, justification and imputation of Christ’s righteousness, especially when the evidence that even Horne himself cites (and conveniently buries in the final endnote) makes clear that Dabney radically rejects Nevin’s views at this very juncture.



2. When the substance behind Horne’s first point of conclusion regarding the agreement between Nevin and Dabney (“Union with Christ is the basis for the justification of believers”) falls apart, the rest of his set of conclusions, which are inferentially drawn from it and are the ultimate conclusions of the entire paper, fall together with it.



3. In order to cover up the fact of Dabney’s radical rejection of Nevin’s understanding of union with Christ, Horne entirely misrepresents a snippet of Dabney’s statement and makes him say exactly the opposite to get them both to some point of agreement regarding redemption. In fact, Dabney categorized Nevin’s views on union of Christ in the very quote that Horne cites as “gross and extreme” and “erroneous and overstrained”.



4. Not only is Dabney NOT the source of vindication for Nevin’s Reformed credentials that Horne contends him to be, but Dabney in fact directly places Nevin and his views outside the Christian pale altogether, even going beyond Hodge in that regard by calling it “semi-Pantheism”.



5. If Dabney’s alleged support was sufficient for Horne to vindicate Nevin’s Reformed credentials, now that the matter has been fully examined and Horne’s case about Dabney’s support for Nevin’s soteriology found wanting, the opposite should be acknowledged: Dabney stands with Hodge to evict Nevin and Mercersburg Theology from the pale of American Presbyterianism and Reformed Orthodoxy.

Mercersburg Theology — A Warning from History

In the middle of the 19th century a theological war broke out in the small German Reformed Church in America. What sparked the fierce controversy in this small haven of American Protestantism was a new movement known as Mercersburg Theology. At its center were its two chief theologians — John Williamson Nevin and Phillip Schaff, who began their careers and launched their movement as professors of the German Reformed Church Seminary in Mercerburg, Pennsylvania. At particular issue were their ideas about “the church question”, the sacraments, and the role of the Scriptures in the Christian life. Nevin, an Old School Presbyterian and former star pupil (and onetime substitute) of Princeton’s Charles Hodge, and Schaff, a theological import from Germany, brought about a revolution that drove the German Reformed Church to high-church liturgy and a synthesis of European Romantic and Hegelian theology. Not coincidently, Hodge became one of Nevin’s fiercest critics, publishing a number of extensive critiques in the Princeton Review.

From the late 1840s–1870s, a theological and liturgical battle was fought that pushed most of the Old School Reformed pastors out of the denomination. Many felt that Mercersburg’s revolution pushed the German Reformed Church perilously close to Rome, if not married the worst vices of Rome to the most serious flaws of Protestantism. In fact, a number of theological students of Nevin and Schaff made very public conversions to the Roman Catholic Church; even Nevin himself left the seminary for several years to contemplate whether his theology dictated that he must “cross the Tiber”, known as his “five years of dizziness”. The Mercersburg School even termed their revolutionary theology as Protestant Catholicism. Mercersburg would face opposition from virtually every segment of the American Reformed Church as diverse as the Princetonian Presbyterians to the Dutch Reformed. Even from some European Protestant theologicans rose their voices in opposition to Mercersburg. In the end, the German Reformed Church was rent asunder and the remnants exist today only as the United Church of Christ (UCC), perhaps the most theological liberal organizations on the planet (who recently added the pseudopigraphal Gospel of Thomas to their biblical canon; Dan Brown would be pleased I’m sure). The UCC today proudly boasts of its Mercersburg heritage.

So why is this important to us today? For those in the Reformed world, the interest is that Mercersburg is undergoing a revival. From a few remote outposts of Reformed Protestantism you can hear talk about “Christocentric” theology over “bibliocentric” theology; you hear others identify themselves as “creedal Christians” of “Christian Catholics”; some encourage us to emphasize the role of the Incarnation over the Cross in the Atonement; denying any understanding of the “invisible church”; an emphasis is made of “union with Christ”, while downplaying or rejecting the imputation of Christ’s righteousness; another buzzword used is “organic” Christianity and the “objectivity of the covenant”; others quite boldly state today that “Christianity is the heresy of heresies.”

Many of these individuals (James Jordan, Jeff Meyers, Mark Horne, Rich Lusk, et al.) hold positions in supposedly conservative Reformed denominations, such as my own church home, the Presbyterian Church in America (PCA). Mercersburg Theology has also been a last gasp defense for a number of Federal Vision advocates who still want to keep up the pretense of being Reformed, pointing to Mercersburg Theology to justify their Reformed credentials. With that in mind, understanding what Mercersburg Theology is can be very helpful for those who react suspiciously to the buzzwords bandied about by Mercersburg’s modern supporters, but aren’t quite sure what this dark theology actually advances.

One peculiar note to Mercersburg is that many of its fiercest early defenders eventually became its loudest later detractors. What follows is the introduction to B.S. Schneck’s Mercersburg Theology Inconsistent with Protestant and Reformed Doctrine, (1871), pp. v–x. Dr. Schneck was one of the pastors forced out of the German Reformed Church because of its embrace of the new revolutionary views. This introduction is actually a letter from an unnamed German Reformed pastor, who admits to being an ecclesiastical supporter of the revolutionaries in the Mercersburg controversy, addressed to Schneck, who had been one of the sponsors of Nevin to his theological chair. But as the catastrophic effects of the Mercersburg revolution could be seen, this unnamed writer was forced to admit the error of his silence and begged to his colleague, Dr. Schneck, to sound the alarm. This is a warning from history to any PCA minister or member who believes that the errors of the Federal Vision should be taken lightly or to those who wish, like Dr. Frankenstein, to revive the corpse of Mercersburg Theology.

(For more on Mercersburg, check out this sermon, A Perverted Gospel or, the Romanizing Tendency of Mercersburg Theology, by prominent German Reformed pastor Jacob Helffenstein, who came from one of the most illustrious families in the GRC. This sermon was his farewell to the church that he loved, but which had abandoned the precious doctrines of grace. Also check out the Theological Issues page (about half-way down) from the website I edit, Paul’s Perspective, for additional article on the topic. I hope to have the full text of Schneck’s volume online soon, as well as other materials, past and present, related to Mercersburg Theology.)

INSTEAD OF A PREFACE.
[THE following letter from an esteemed ministerial brother tells all that is necessary to be said in the way of motive for preparing the following work, This letter and its author, therefore, must he regarded as sharing the chief responsibility in an undertaking which, in itself, had no attractions for me in any view of the case.]

“REVEREND AND DEAR BROTHER:

“Like yourself, I have taken no part in the unfortunate controversies which have been going on for years in our Church. Honestly believing that matters were not so grave and serious as some supposed, and confiding in the oft-repeated declaration that our professors and others were misunderstood, I was led to exercise to the utmost that charity which ‘hopeth all things and believeth all things.’ And so I was even disposed to defend these brethren. In ecclesiastical affairs I also stood by them. Yet I had to acknowledge to myself all the while that in defending their teachings — for instance, against Messrs. Bomberger, Good, Williard, etc. — there was often a want of manly candor and an effort to avoid meeting the weightier points in dispute. Thus, when proofs were furnished from history by those brethren against some of the doctrinal teachings by the professors, those proofs were as often not noticed. When Reformed standards were quoted as against the professors on some of the gravest questions, that was quietly passed by. But when a little flaw in an opponent was thought to be discovered, then there was a loud trumpet sounded in regard to it, winding up with what looked very much like gauzy cunning, by telling the reader that ‘such was the way with every thing which came from that side, and hence it was not worth while to notice the opponents.’ Thus, some Western writer, it seems, had said something in reference to the present or revised liturgy (‘Order of Worship’), and called it the ‘new Order of Worship’ (or perhaps ‘New Order of Worship’). That was a life-and-death question! To put the word new before the title was an offense of very grave magnitude; and so the Western man is pounced upon with ludicrous ferocity, and duly informed, ‘as in such cases made and provided,’ that if a man does not study and duly know the proper and authorized title of a book, he is incompetent to write on the merit of the book, or for that matter, I suppose, on any other subject. Now look at it. The revised Liturgy (‘Order of Worship’) is the ‘new,’ as compared with the former or first Liturgy by the committee, and has been so called over and over again by its own friends in the Messenger, and has been so called even by Dr. Nevin himself, the chief author of the book! (See Vindic. of Lit., p. 51, etc.) Now, such and similar things have all along been noticed by myself and others with pain, but I refrained from dwelling upon them. So also the late effort to cast reproach upon Dr. B., Dr. G., and others, in connection with the conversion of several of our ministers to the Roman Catholic Church, had a most painful effect upon my mind; and several others, ministers and laymen, I found, were impressed in the same way. I looked at it in this way. Here are several men who were among the leaders of the Mercersburg theology. They wrote fiery articles about it, and some of them bitter articles against some of the best and most useful men in our Church, — men whom, although I differed from them in some things, I could not but respect and honor. For years it had been believed that those recent converts were traveling towards Rome, but when it was sometimes hinted at, not only those men themselves denied it but our professors and others publicly denied that the theological system of Mercersburg could lead any one to that ‘citadel of safety.’ But one and another at last did get there, and then they said, frankly and openly, that the teaching at Mercersburg led them step by step thitherward. And when now the opponents of Mercersburg pointed to these confessions (Geo. D. Wolff’s confession, for instance), the professors et al. raise the mordio cry of: Our opponents (Dr. B. et al.) are ‘leagued with the perverts’ – ‘Wolff writes articles for the anti-Liturgical men,’ etc. I confess to you, dear brother, that such disingenuous treatment, even of my opponents as well as theirs, is more than I could stand, and made me hesitate-falter. I now concluded to examine more closely into the merits of the general question at issue, to endeavor to get, if possible, to the bottom of things. I said to myself, You have not studied these subjects as you should have done; you have taken things on trust. And I had not fairly gotten into the matter before my paper brought me the bold — I feel like saying daring — attacks upon the most precious and consoling truth in the Christian system, and which is so fully and clearly set forth in our Catechism, You know to what I refer, — to the doctrine of the Atonement. . . .

“On further reading, I found that the same antagonism had also been shown against other cardinal truths, — justification by faith, for instance; but not so boldly, more negatively than positively. I began now also to understand the frequent thrusts, innuendoes, and slighting remarks in regard to the Scriptures (making an ‘idol of them,’ and saying that, apart from the living minister (priest), they were of no more account than the Koran!); to doctrines, etc., as if they were of very little account; and speaking of others, who ‘believe that they are justified by faith, that they believed in what was justification by fancy or feeling,’ and more than insinuating that all real inward operations of the mind were shams in a religious way, — the experimental piety, in other words, ‘of reigning Protestantism’ was branded as a ‘false spiritualism, as ‘Phrygian Montanism,’ ranting, demented ‘fanaticism — as an order of ‘nature,’ — in short, bad as Sinbad the Sailor. . . .

“My heart is full as I write. I think of the glorious truths which you and I have preached, and without which we would not know what preaching was for, or of what worth it was. I think of the dying Christian whom I have seen clasping these truths to his heart as the only balm for his spirit, the only cordial for his fears. I think of the blessed martyrs, not only in Apostolic times, but in later centuries, who, rather than bow down and worship saint and crucifix, chose rather to go to the stake or the fire, warmed within and armed for the ordeal by the experimental truth of Christ and Him crucified as a living power in their hearts; and I rose up from my study-chair, and, whilst pacing the room in the dead silence of night, I solemnly vowed to be bound by personal and social ties no longer in this matter, but, if need be, brave the unfriendly looks of some otherwise dear brethren; for truth is higher than friendship.

“For at least ten years had I waited to find out where exactly those new views would lead us, — ten years trying to understand these brethren, fondly hoping, like not a few others, that the fog would clear away and bring us a brighter day. But the day came not. ‘You do not understand them,’ had been iterated and reiterated until I became wearied with the phrasing. I said at last, ‘Why cannot Dr. Nevin and his pupils write in such a manner that intelligent men can understand them?’ We can understand Neander (awkwardly as he often did express himself). We can understand Hengstenberg, and De Wette, and Ebrard, and Dorner, and Nitzsch, and Hodge. We can understand the teaching of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Apostles. Why, then, after a practice of more than twenty years, can these men not write so that other mortals can understand them? If a man has something to say and wants others to know it (without any reserve on his part), he generally can make himself understood. It is said not to be learning, but the want of learning, that renders men unintelligible. Dr. Hodge had to say of his old friend Dr. Nevin (on the appearance of the latter’s introduction to Dr. Schaff’s ‘Principles of Protestantism,’ and that was as long ago as A.D. 1845), that he found it difficult to understand him. Surely, if such a man could not, it is not to be wondered at if men of ordinary calibre cannot. If a preacher of the gospel cannot make himself understood, it is usually said, either that the truth is not clear to his own mind, or that he does not venture to speak out courageously what is in him. Is it not so?

“But I think that of late we do understand these men tolerably well. When the articles on ‘Early Christianity,’ ‘Cyprian,’ etc., appeared, Dr. Nevin was merely attacking the form of Protestantism, pulling down, ignoring (I cannot help being reminded of ‘Ich bin der Geist der stets verneint’); then came the attack against the ‘Sects’ (Dr. Schaff called it ‘eine Sektenschlacht’), harsh, bitter, as if the pen had been dipped in bitter fluid: so I thought when I first read it, with all my respect for the writer. Such thoughts as these came into my mind: Doctor, who gives thee authority to strike thy fellow-servant, redeemed by the precious blood of the same Saviour? Is it not the spirit of the two disciples whom the Divine Master rebuked for calling down fire upon their fellow-sinners? And then, art not thou a sectarist thyself? Where is thy apostolical succession, unbroken down to this present? And where is thy ‘Church’? . . .

Then came the tinkering with the 80th Question of the Catechism, which also at that time affected me adversely. It was pronounced unfortunate that the ‘mass’ should be called an ‘idolatry,’ and of course all ‘we boys’ took up the refrain, according to the German couplet, —

‘Wie die Alten sungen
Zwitschern die Jungen.’

Next the ‘Creed’ had to be tinkered; the Greek word hades must be put in the place of hell. Cui bono? The universal Church, Catholic and Protestant, have used this last term. Every intelligent layman knew its import. Who gave, moreover, a few men the authority to produce a dissonance in the repeating of the Creed? A synodical president must tell us, too, that the Reformers went too far in their work, etc., etc. . .

“Now, my dear brother, all these things have been much on my mind; and, to bring the matter to the point which is the aim of this long epistle, let me say that I regard it as the duty of some one to speak forth calmly, but decidedly and intelligibly, so that all may understand what are the doctrines of the Church and what are not. And I have it in my mind to say you are the person. Your age and experience, your former position as a public man, and your known conservatism, seem to single you out before others to do just this work. Resides, although you were the first man who, twenty odd years ago, sounded the first ‘bugle-blast,’ as ‘Irenæs’ lately told us in the Messenger, yet you have not taken any part, so far as I know, in the controversies for years. You are known, moreover, to have been the friend personally of our professors; known to have first mentioned, and had proposed through another, the name of Dr. Nevin as professor in our seminary (prompted by your ‘better half’), as the lamented Rev. John Cares in his lifetime said, who during the special Synod in Chambersburg was an eye-witness of the fact in your own house. Then, too, you have, so far as I know, no reason to be dissatisfied with the Church’s treatment of yourself; for she has in her time loaded you with a considerable share of duties and onerous burdens, which some men would perhaps count as so much honor. All this and more, it seems to me, fits you for this needed work, whether it be agreeable to you or not. Remember, dear brother, that the path of duty is not always the path of self-choice or of pleasure. Think of what I say, and do as God may seem to bid you. I refrain from a peroration. But this one thing I will yet add, which I omitted to say in the right place: you have no prejudices against you of any moment, for the reasons already stated, neither can you be accused of seeking ‘your own’ in coming before the public. You have no ambition to gratify, no personal animosities to cherish or avenge. To you many will listen who would not listen to others, because these have aroused prejudices against themselves by their active participation in controversy, to which I firmly believe they were not led by unhallowed motives. But my sheets are full, and you are weary. God direct you, bless you! . . . .”

James Orr -- Worldview Apologist

I'm presently engaging in a study of the long-neglected Scottish worldview apologist, James Orr with a view to author a paper on his thinking that would share the title of this blog post. What I'm presently reading in this regard is Glen Scorgie's excellent volume, A Call for Continuity: The Theological Contribution of James Orr (2004), perhaps the most accessible text for getting an introduction to Orr's critical contribution to Christian worldview studies.

Orr's role in developing an understanding of the concept of worldview for Christians has been largely overshadowed by his contemporary, Abraham Kuyper. But even Kuyper had to acknowledge (albeit briefly) his indebtedness to Orr's formulation of Christianity as a Weltanschauung ("life and world view"; "life-system" as used by Kuyper; known to us as "worldview" today) in the opening pages of his Stone Lectures, published today as Lectures on Calvinism (p. 11, fn. 1). So important is Orr to Kuyper that Kuyper scholar Peter Heslam says:

"The transition to the full use of the worldview concept as the central feature of Kuyper's though was largely due to the influence of the Scottish theologian James Orr (1844-1913) ... Although Kuyper made only a fleeting reference to Orr in one of the footnotes of his Lectures, it does appear that Kuyper's Stone Lectures were influenced significantly by his reading of Orr's Keer Lectures for 1890-91." (Peter Heslam, "The Meeting of the Wellsprings: Kuyper and Warfield at Princeton," in Religion, Pluralism, and Public Life: Abraham Kuyper's Legacy for the Twenty-First Century (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000): p. 26; cf. Heslam, Creating a Christian Worldview: Abraham Kuyper's Lectures on Calvinism, pp. 88-89, 92-96)

Later evangelical worlview thinkers would also acknowledge their indebtedness to Orr's formulation (e.g. Carl F.H. Henry, "Fortunes of the Christian Worldview," Trinity Journal n.s. 19 (1998): 163-176, esp. 163). For this reason, it's not surprising that David Naugle begins his extensive study of worldview in his Worldview: The History of a Concept with Orr (pp. 6-13).

In his magisterial, The Christian View of God and the World, Orr makes the case that understanding Christianity as a comprehensive worldview is important for apologetic purposes. In his day, Christianity was under assault from many points of modernist attack from liberal theology, evolutionary naturalism and higher criticism. Instead of having to defend the articles of the Christian faith separately, Orr argued that the defense of Christianity should be rooted in presenting Christianity, not as an amalgam of unrelated proposition, but as an entire system of thought and belief in toto. Christian truth was interrelated. Hence the "call for continuity". Cultural apologetics, Orr submitted, must be done by using the multi-faceted strength of the entire Christian worldview. As Orr states it:

"the opposition which Christianity has to encounter is no longer confined to special doctrines or to points of supposed conflict with the natural sciences... but extends to the whole manner of conceiving the world, and of man's place in it... It is no longer an opposition of detail, but of principle... It is the Christian view of things in general which is attacked, an it is by an exposition and vindication of the Christian view of things as a whole that the attack can most successfully be met." (p. 4)

And again:

"I shall endeavour to show that the Christian view of things forms a logical whole which cannot be infringed on, or accepted or rejected piecmeal, but stands or falls in its integrity, and can only suffer from attempts at amalgamation or compromise with theories which rest on totally distinct bases." (p. 16)

One element that attracts me to Orr's approach is how theological it is. Far from shying away from systematic theology as an "abstraction" (a view advanced in our day by the Federal Vision crowd), theology is the lifeblood of the Christian worldview. What was needed, according to Orr, was an advance of theological interest, not a retreat from it:

"I venture to say that what the church suffers from today is not, as so many think, too much theology, but too little theology, of an earnest kind." (Orr, The Progress of Dogma, p. 9n)

The role of theology was so important to the Christian worldview that Orr dedicated the rest of his career to defending the Christian faith through theological study and polemics, as we see in his later books: The Progress of Dogma (1901), God's Image in Man (1905), The Problem of the Old Testament (1906 - against higher criticism), The Virgin Birth of Christ (1907), The Resurrection of Jesus (1908), and Revelation and Inspiration (1910). Even the full title of The Christian View speaks to how essential the doctrine of the Incarnation was to his understanding of worldview: The Christian View of God and the World, as Centring in the Incarnation. His citation by the German theologian Issac August Dorner in The Christian View informs us to the critical link between Christian theology and the whole system of Christian thought:

"A Christian system which is unable to make Christology an integral part of itself, has pronounced its own judgment; it has really given up the claim to the title of Christian." (p. 41)

An added element of attraction for Orr's view is how he conceives of the Christian worldview as a comprehensive system of thought, reminiscent of Kuyper's "Every Inch" speech:

"He who with his whole heart believes in Jesus as the Son of God is thereby committed to much else besides. He is committed to a view of God, a view of man, to a view of sin, to a view of Redemption, to a view of the purpose of God in creation and history, to a view of human destiny, found only in Christianity. This forms a 'Weltanschauung," or "Christian view of the world," which stands in marked contrast with theories wrought out from a purely philosophical or scientific standpoint." (p. 4)

In our day, evangelicalism compartmentalizes apologetics apart from theology. This is especially true for the evidentialist method, but is also found amongst presuppositionalism. Orr warns us against this tendency. The Christian apologist must not only presuppose the Christian worldview, but their apologetic must be an advancement of the Christian worldview itself.

I must admit that The Christian View is not your light reading. When I first read it several years ago, I regularly found myself drifting off. But the details here are important to the case that Orr makes on the whole. This is what makes Scorgie's introduction to the life, times and thought of Orr a perfect place to initiate a study of Orr, because it makes his arguments and approach much more understandable for the current reader that is probably not overly familiar with late 19th Century philosophy and theology. Do yourself a favor: start with Scorgie.